By: Joe Emersberger - HaitiAnalysis.com

The significance of the Haitian presidential elections of February 2006, has been ignored by the corporate press. That isn't surprising given that the results exposed the most damaging distortion the international press reported about the ouster of President Jean Bertrand Aristide - that it was the result of a "popular uprising" against him.

Voters delivered a decisive rebuke to the most prominent people involved in the coup of February 29, 2004. Guy Philippe, the rebel whom the press told us was greeted by huge, cheering crowds after Aristide's ouster, received less than 2% of the vote. Charles Baker, a sweatshop owner widely and uncritically quoted by the press before and after the coup, received 6%.

Rene Preval, who was endorsed by the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, a prominent Aristide ally and former political prisoner, eventually prevailed after massive non-violent protest foiled the de facto government's last gasp attempt at fraud.

The Canadian government was responsible for organizing the presidential elections of 2006. A top Canadian elections coordinator agreed to anonymously give an insider's perspective on those elections.

Q: You were paid by CANADEM to help with the Feb 2006 elections that resulted in Rene Preval becoming Haiti's president. What exactly was your role with CANADEM?

I was contracted by CANADEM on behalf of Elections Canada (EC) and the International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections (IMMHE) to serve as the short-term elections observer (STO) coordinator. In this capacity, I was responsible for the overall coordination of the STO mission logistics (transportation, housing, regional deployments, briefing, etc.).

Q: Where did CANADEM get the funds to pay you? Who funds CANADEM?

CANADEM is funded primarily by the department of foreign affairs (DFAIT). Its role in managing the logistics of the Haiti mission was funded by Elections Canda.

Q: How much time did you spend working in Haiti? Was it your first time there?

I spent between 4-5 months in Haiti, over the course of 4 visits. I had not been there before.

Q: Where were you based? Did you get to see what was going on in Cite Soleil and other Lavalas strongholds?

I was based in Petionville at the very elite Montana hotel. Cite Soleil was considered red zone, which meant that it was off limits to mission personnel. I unfortunately did not get to see what was happening in Lavalas strongholds.

Q: Which people or organizations were you mainly interacting with while you were there?

I mainly interacted with Canadian embassy personnel, MINUSTAH, UNOPS, IFES, CEP (the electoral commission), and representatives of various development organizations.

Q: What were you expecting to accomplish through your work with CANADEM?

I was hoping to develop a better understanding of how observation missions operate, as well as acquire a better understanding of the realities of the developing world.

Q: What were your preconceptions going into Haiti and how did they change?

I questioned the logic of democracy promotion from the very outset. I had no real illusions about the role of Canada and the US in Haitian politics. That being said, however, I did think that electoral observation missions were somewhat removed from the more blatantly imperialistic civil society interventions such as those sponsored by agencies such as the IRI and NDI. Although I still believe that electoral observation missions can theoretically help consolidate more democratic systems—-however limited--I also see how they are just as often manipulated to provide legitimacy to an overall process that is fundamentally flawed. In Haiti, for example, the actual election-days was relatively non-violent and personnel at the voting centres very much committed to maintaining the integrity of the process. This meant that the observation missions could give their stamp of approval to the limited events that transpired on the election days (to say nothing of the fraud that did occur), while overlooking the political repression and campaign of disenfranchisement that tainted the entire process leading up to the elections.

Q: What kind of background information did Canadian officials give you to explain, in general, what you were trying to accomplish in Haiti?

I did not receive a briefing on objectives per se, as I was very much part of the Ottawa-based NGO-state network that prepared the mission. That being said, I held many conversations with government officials who saw their work in terms of trying to make the best of a bad situation. Many were frankly critical of the coup that overthrew Aristide, but their criticism was tempered by a belief that Canada acted differently than the US and that Aristide wasn’t great to begin with.

Q: How did the huge delays and the evidence of fraud impact the moral of people who worked on the elections?

Not very much as far as I know.

Q: What information was being internally provided to Elections Canada by the observers?

Long term observers were stationed in each of the departments and were providing weekly reports to the IMMHE secretariat on all aspects of the electoral process. Much of this was quite critical (e.g., issues of repression). Additionally, approximately 15 expert assessors conducted assessments on specific components of the electoral process over the course of the mission, such as voter registration, tabulation, etc.

Q: Why were the observers' reports not made public?

You would have to ask Electoins Canada.

Q: If you could go back in time what would you do differently? Would you accept work with CANADEM?

As it stands, I would not do anything differently, as I was happy with the electoral outcome and was able to gain valuable insight into the inner workings of democracy promotion which will serve as the foundations to my own critical research. If, however, a repressive right-wing party had won, well, then I would have felt morally compromised and extremely guilt-ridden. As it was, I was let of the hook by historical events. Would I do it again knowing what I know now but not knowing the political outcome? I don’t know… On a very personal level, Haiti exposed me to the realities of development as an imperialistic enterprise. I think I needed to have this personal insight in order not to follow this as a career path. I don’t mean to place my own personal needs above the fate of an entire society, I just mean to say that given my educational background, career path, etc., I was bound to make an ontological rupture at some point. And the only way this could have happened was by experiencing it first hand.